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Abstract. This paper is concerned with the problem of how effective social in-
teraction arises from individual social action and mind. The need to study the
individual social mind suggests a move towards the notion of sociological agents
who can model their social environment as opposed to acting socially within it.
This does not constrain social behaviour; on the contrary, we argue that it pro-
vides the requisite information and understanding for such behaviour to be effec-
tive. Indeed, it is not enough for agents to model other agents in isolation; they
must also model the relationships between them. A sociological agent is thus an
agent that can model agents and agent relationships. Several existing models use
notions of autonomy and dependence to show how this kind of interaction comes
about, but the level of analysis is limited. In this paper, we show how an exist-
ing agent framework leads naturally to the enumeration of a map of inter-agent
relationships that can be modelled and exploited by sociological agents to enable
more effective operation, especially in the context of multi-agent plans.
1 Introduction
Underlying all multi-agent systems are the notions of interaction and cooperation. Much
research in the area of intelligent agents has thus sought to develop computational mech-
anisms for bringing about and sustaining these relationships in a dynamic and open
world. The focus on mechanisms is just one part of the set of areas for investigation,
however, and a separate and distinct strand of work aims to provide an understanding
of the relationships themselves and how agents may influence each other through these
relationships over the course of time. Over a number of years, one such effort has been
in the work of Castelfranchi and Conte, which has focussed on issues relating to the
social foundations of multi-agent systems. For example, they point out that the problem
of how to allocate tasks and resources and how to coordinate actions is typically raised
only after a collective or social problem or goal is assumed [3]. One key question in
consideration of this is how society is implemented in the minds of social agents.
There are many definitions of a social agent. For example, Wooldridge states that
any agent in a multi-agent system is necessarily social [14] and Moulin and Chaib-
draa [10] take an agent to be social if it can model others. However, the term is more
often associated with social activity such as provided by Wooldridge and Jennings [15]
who refer to the process of interaction. Yet the need to study the individual social mind
suggests a move towards the notion of sociological agents who can model their social
environment as opposed to acting socially within it. This does not constrain social be-
haviour; on the contrary, we argue that it provides the requisite information and under-
standing for such behaviour to be effective. We argue that effective social agents must
be sociological. These notions are implicit in the work of Castelfranchi, in particular,
which has led to the construction and refinement of a theory of social relationships based
on notions of inter-agent dependence[2, 4]. Taking as a base his Social Power Theory
(SPT), he has sought to provide a computational model of autonomy and inter-agent
relationships through the Social Dependence Networks (SDN)[12] that implement the
constructs of SPT.
The point of this work is to identify dependence situations in which one agent de-
pends on another for actions or resources, or is autonomous with respect to these com-
ponents, according to a particular plan. Using these notions of dependence, the nego-
tiation power of an agent can be found to represent how well an agent can sell itself
on a market. Underlying this very powerful theory are plans, yet the analyses possi-
ble, while revealing certain information about inter-agent relationships, are still rather
crude. In order to provide a more detailed and precise account of these dependencies,
further analysis is required. SDN provides the motivation from a very particular per-
spective for considering agent plans, while more general social interaction provides a
broader base of direction.
It is not enough for agents to model other agents in isolation; they must also model
the relationships between them. A sociological agent is an agent that can model agents
and agent relationships. In this paper, we show how an existing agent framework leads
naturally to the enumeration of a map of inter-agent relationships that can be modelled
and exploited by sociological agents to enable more effective operation, especially in
the context of multi-agent plans. Importantly, the resulting strong model of individual
agents could be applied to clarify several issues in SDN. Constraints of space, however,
limit the potential for showing the particular impact on SDN, but we illustrate the po-
tential benefits of the analysis with a detailed example at the end. The paper begins with
a brief review of an agent framework and the relationships that arise within it, and then
proceeds to provide a detailed description of single and multi-agent plans, identifying
useful categories of plans and agents.
2 Preliminaries
Agent Framework Elsewhere, we have presented an agent framework to define enti-
ties, objects, agents and autonomous agents. Below we provide a brief overview of the
main aspects of the framework [6, 8], and the relationships that arise within it [9], but
we omit a detailed exposition. We use the Z notation [13] to formalise these notions
and, though we assume some familiarity, the meaning should be clear.
As specified in Figure 1, an entity comprises a set of motivations, a set of goals, a
set of actions, and a set of attributes such that the attributes and actions are non-empty.
Entities can be used to group together attributes into a whole without any functionality.
They serve as a useful abstraction mechanism by which they are regarded as distinct
from the remainder of the environment, to organise perception. An object is then an en-
tity with abilities that can affect the environment in which it is situated. Now, an agent
is just an object either that is useful to another agent in terms of satisfying that agent’s
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Fig. 1. Formal specification of the agent framework
goals, or that exhibits independent purposeful behaviour. In other words, an agent is an
object with an associated set of goals, but one object may give rise to different instan-
tiations of agents with different goals. This notion of agency relies upon the existence
of other agents to provide the goals that are adopted to instantiate an agent. In order to
escape an infinite regress of goal adoption, however, we can define autonomous agents,
which are just agents that generate their own goals from motivations (not dissimilar to
Antunes’s notion of values [1]). We can also distinguish objects that are not agents,
and agents that are not autonomous, as neutral-objects and server-agents respectively.
An agent is then either a server-agent or an autonomous agent, and an object is either
a neutral-object or an agent, and a multi-agent system simply contains a collection of
these entities.
Agent Relations When an agent uses another non-autonomous entity, the entity adopts
or satisfies the agent’s goals and creates a social relationship [2] known as an engage-
ment. In a direct engagement, a neutral-object or a server-agent adopts the goals of
another. Chains of engagements are also possible, explicitly representing the goal and
all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements. Since goals are grounded
by motivations, the agent at the head of the chain must be autonomous.
Now, since it can generate its goals and decide when to adopt the goals of others,
an autonomous agent is said to be cooperating with another autonomous agent if it
has adopted the goal or goals of the other. This notion of autonomous goal acquisition
applies both to the origination of goals by an autonomous agent for its own purposes,
and the adoption of goals from others. A cooperation describes a goal, the autonomous
agent that generated the goal, and those autonomous agents who have adopted that goal
from the generating agent. (At any point in time, such autonomous agents may then be
cooperating with others as well as attempting to satisfy their own self-motivated goals.)
Further details of these relationships, specified in Figure 2, may be found elsewhere [9].
These inter-agent relationships are not imposed, but arise naturally from our view
of agents as they interact (regardless of the manner of their initiation) and therefore un-
derlie all multi-agent systems. They provide a means for analysing the interdependence
of agents in terms of the goals some agents achieve for others. Moreover, from this
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Fig. 2. Formal specification of agent relationships
basic set of constructions, we can derive a detailed map of the relationships between
individual agents for a better understanding of their current social interdependence. In
particular, different situations of interdependence each suggest different possibilities for
interaction. Below, we enumerate the various possible relations that might result in this
view. Each relation is described and defined formally.
– The direct engagement relationship specifies the situation in which there is a direct
engagement for which the first agent is the client and the second agent is the server.
Thus, an agent, o , directly engages another server-agent, p , if, and only if, there is
a direct engagement between o and p .
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– The notion of direct engagement implies a tight coupling between the behaviours of
the agents involved without an intermediate entity. However, there may be entities
an agent engages that indirectly serve some purpose for it. An agent o engages an-
other (server) agent p if there is some engagement chain vAo that includes p , such that
either o is wAvyxUzT{ﬂv3p in the chain or o is the autonomous agent of vAo . (This requires
the wAv|xUzS{ﬂv relation, which holds between a pair of elements and a sequence of ele-
ments if the first element of the pair precedes the second element in the sequence.
The details are omitted here.)
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– To distinguish engagements involving an intermediate agent we introduce the in-
direct engagement relation fNvU>N#NvUp . An agent indirectly engages another if it
engages it, but does not directly engage it.
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– If many agents directly engage the same entity, then no single agent has complete
control over it. Any actions an agent takes affecting the entity may destroy or hinder
the engagements of the other engaging agents. This in turn, may have a deleterious
effect on the engaging agents themselves. It is therefore important to understand
when the behaviour of an engaged entity can be modified without any deleterious
effect (such as when no other agent uses the entity for a different purpose). In this
case we say that the agent owns the entity. An agent, o , owns another agent, p , if,
for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain, vAo , in which p appears,
o precedes it, or o is the autonomous client-agent that initiated the chain.
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– An agent, o , directly owns another agent, p , if it owns it, and directly engages it. For-
mally, this relation is the intersection of the direct engagement relation, v..v:p ,
and the generic ownership relation, zTp .
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– A further distinction of direct ownership can be made. Either no other agent di-
rectly owns the entity, or there is another agent who is also directly engaging that
entity for the same purpose. The first case occurs normally but the second situa-
tion can occur if the entity is engaged by two agents, each for the same purpose as
generated by a single autonomous agent. To distinguish these situations we define
the uniquely owns relation, which holds when an agent directly and solely owns
another. An agent o uniquely owns another p , if it directly owns it, and no other
agent is engaging it.
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– An agent may own another with respect to either multiple distinct goals (which
may conflict) or a single goal. The distinction is important because achieving one
goal may affect the achievement of another. An agent, o , specifically owns another
agent, p , if it owns it, and o has only one goal.
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– Finally, an agent, w , cooperates with agent,  , if and only if both agents are au-
tonomous, and there is some cooperation in which  is the generating agent and w
is in the set of cooperating agents. Notice that the relationship is not symmetric: if
w is cooperating with  ,  need not be cooperating with w .
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This analysis of the relationships between agents provides computational entities
with a means of determining how they should approach interactions with those agents.
For example, if I own an entity, I can do as I please, and other agents would be ill-
advised to attempt to use this entity for another purpose. If I only engage it, then I may
be more constrained in my interaction and may anticipate other agents engaging it.
The framework described above, together with the relationships arising from it, are
suitable for reasoning both about entities in the world, and with entities in the world.
That is to say that in addition to providing us with a way of understanding and analysing
agents, agents themselves can also use the entity hierarchy as a basis for reasoning
about other agents within their environment. It may be relevant, for example, for them
to consider the functionality of other agents and the likelihood, that these others may
or may not be predisposed to help in the completion of certain tasks. In this section we
describe how we enable the possibility within agents of such reasoning.
Models If agents are to model their environment, they need more than just actions,
goals and motivations; they require an internal store. Agents without internal stores are
extremely limited since their past experience cannot direct behaviour, and actions can
only be selected reflexively. A store exists as part of an agent’s state in an environment
but it must also have existed prior to that current state. We call this feature an internal
store or memory, and define store agents as those with memories. Formally, a store-
agent is a refinement of an agent, with the addition of a pUzT{ﬂv variable represented as a
non-empty set of attributes. We omit this simple schema due to space constraints.
The most obvious things to represent in such models are other agents. Thus we
need to describe agents who can model others in their environment and, for sufficiently
advanced agents, the autonomy of others. However, it is inadequate to model entities in
isolation; the relationships between them must also be modelled. Unlike social agents
that engage in interaction with others (or social activity), sociological agents also model
agent relationships. It is a simple matter to define the model an agent has of another
agent ( Gv.yzv. ), or its model of a cooperation relationship ( Jz#zAzv. ) by re-
using the agent framework components.
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Even though the types of these constructs are equivalent to those presented earlier,
it is useful to distinguish physical constructs from mental constructs such as models,
as it provides a conceptual aid. Similarly, we can define the models agents have of
entities, objects and autonomous agents as well as models of other relationships we
have described (though only the model of a cooperation is given above). A sociological
agent is thus specified as a refinement of the ﬁNv. schema.
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3 Plans
In this section we develop our models of agents further to consider multi-agent plans.
Sometimes, agents may select an action, or a set of concurrent actions, to achieve goals
directly. At other times, however, there may not be such a simple correspondence be-
tween goals and actions, and appropriately designed agents may perform sequences of
actions, or plans, to achieve their goals. In multi-agent systems, agents have at their dis-
posal not only their own capabilities but, potentially, the capabilities of others. Agents
with plans requiring actions outside their competence need models of others to consider
making use of their capabilities. If these agents are sociological then they can evaluate
plans with respect to their model of current agent relationships. For example, agents
can decide to what extent plans can exploit current relationships as well as consider
how they may impinge on them. In general, agents must reason about exploiting exist-
ing and potential relationships without inadvertently or unnecessarily destroying them.
In this work, we do not model the process of planning, but instead consider how
plans can be modelled and how agents can evaluate plans using these models. Similar
to the BDI view, we take an agent to have a repository of goals and a repository of
plans that have either been designed before the agent starts executing [7] or acquired
and developed over the course of the agent’s life [11]. Each plan may be associated with
one or more goals, identifying the plan as a potential means of achieving those goals,
as used for example, by Georgeff [7].
There are many different notions of agent plans both at the theoretical and the prac-
tical level, and in order to substantiate the claim that the agent framework and ensuing
models can be generally applied it is necessary that different representations of plans
can all be equally accommodated. Whilst we do not specify every type of plan of which
we are aware, we do intend to show how the agent framework can be extended to de-
scribe familiar notions of plans, and to impress upon the reader how other models of
plans can be similarly accommodated. We aim to achieve this by specifying general
theoretical plan representations that we call total plans, partial plans and tree plans.
One methodological characteristic of our work is the incremental development of
the models in it. Therefore, we first construct a high-level model of plan-agents, which
applies equally well to reactive or deliberative, single-agent or multi-agent, planners.
It represents a high-level of abstraction because nothing is decided about the nature
of the agent, the plan representation, or of the agent’s environment; we simply distin-
guish categories of plan and possible relationships between an agent’s plans and goals.
Specifically, we define active plans as those identified as candidate plans not yet se-
lected for execution; and executable plans as those active plans that have been selected
for execution.
Formally, we initially define the set of all agent plans to be a given set (  '~S ),
so that at this stage we abstract out any information about the nature of plans them-
selves. Our highest-level description of a plan-agent can then be formalised in the
'RSVGv. schema below. Since plans must be encoded as aspects of an internal store,
the  fXzS{vﬁNv.y fXTXv schema is included.
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The variables z#TByw , \RSByw , No.|¨SvX\RS]p and vﬂ©>vAo.ªNwURvCf~Sp represent the agent’s
repository of goals, repository of plans, active plans and executable plans, respectively.
Each active plan is necessarily associated with one or more of the agent’s current
goals as specified by No.|¨+vCf~SzS . For example, if the function contains the pair
«
¬:­®S¬V¯T¬>°±² , it indicates that ® , >¯ and V° are competing active plans for  . Whilst
active plans must be associated with at least one active goal the converse is not true,
since agents may have goals for which no plans have been considered. Analogously the
fRTz#TByw function relates the repository of goals, zSByw , to the repository of plans,
fRT]Byw . However, not necessarily all library plans and goals are related by this function.
A plan consisting of a total order of plan-actions is a total plan, which is repre-
sented as a sequence of plan-actions. (Other types of plan can be defined similarly and
accommodated easily within our specification.) In single-agent systems, all the actions
of such plans must be within the agent’s capabilities. However, plan-agents in multi-
agent systems can consider executing plans containing actions not within their capabil-
ities as long as they can model the capabilities of others as we have described. It is our
claim that if plan agents are also sociological agents then they can make more informed
choices about plan selection. (Of course, while this describes how an agent can con-
sider its use of plans involving others, it does not impact the issues involved in whether
those others choose to cooperate or not.) Agents can be constrained in their design by
including additional predicates. For example, it is possible to restrict the active plans
of an agent, with respect to a current goal, to those which are related to that goal by
the function \RS>NzSByw . This can be achieved in the specification of such an agent by
including the following predicate.
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Multi-Agent Plans In order for agents to reason about plans involving others it is
necessary to analyse the nature of the plans themselves. This involves defining first
the components of a plan, and then the structure of a plan, as shown in Figure 3. The
components, which we call plan-actions, each consist of a composite-action and a set
of related entities as described below. The structure of plans defines the relationship
of the component plan-actions to one another. For example, plans may be total and
define a sequence of plan-actions, partial and place a partial order on the performance
of plan-actions, or trees and, for example, allow choice between alternative plan-actions
at every stage in the plan’s execution.
We identify four types of action that may be contained in plans, called primitive,
template, concurrent-primitive and concurrent-template. There may be other categories
and variations on those we have chosen but not only do they provide a starting point for
specifying systems, they also illustrate how different representations can be formalised
and incorporated within the same model. A primitive action is simply a base action as
defined in the agent framework. An action template provides a high-level description of
what is required by an action, defined as the set of all primitive actions that may result
through an instantiation of that action-template. For example, in dMARS [5], template
actions represent action formulae containing free variables, and become primitive ac-
tions when bound to values. Concurrent-primitive and concurrent-template actions are
primitive actions and action templates performed concurrently. We define a new type,
$o#y}JzS·$ , as a compound-action to include all four of these types.
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Fig. 3. Plan components and structure
Actions must be performed by entities, so we associate every compound-action in
a plan with a set of entities, such that each entity in the set can potentially perform the
action. At some stage in the planning process this set may be empty, indicating that no
choice of entity has yet been made. We define a plan-action as a set of pairs, where
each pair contains a compound-action and a set of those entities that could potentially
perform the action. Plan-actions are defined as a set of pairs rather than single pairs so
that plans containing simultaneous actions can be represented.
The following examples illustrate this representation. First, action  ® is to be per-
formed by either the plan-agent itself or the entity v.|yÇÈ . The second example de-
scribes the two separate actions,  ¯:É and  ¯Ê , being performed simultaneously by the
two entities vUfy|Ç]È and vUfy|ÇË respectively. Then, the third example states that the
actions  °:É and  °ﬂÊ are to be performed simultaneously. No entity has been established
as a possibility to perform  °AÉ , and  °Ê is to be performed by either v.|yÇ>Ë or v.|yÇÌ .
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We specify three commonly-found categories of plan according to their structure
as discussed earlier. Other types may be specified similarly. A partial plan imposes a
partial order on the execution of actions, subject to two constraints. First, an action
cannot be performed before itself and, second, if plan-action  is before w , w cannot
be before  . A plan consisting of a total order of plan-actions is a total plan. Formally,
this is represented as a sequence of plan-actions. A plan that allows a choice between
actions at every stage is a tree. In general, a tree is either a leaf node containing a plan-
action, or a fork containing a node, and a (non-empty) set of branches each leading to a
tree. These are formalised in Figure 3, replacing the definition of 'RT as a given set by
a free-type definition to include the three plan categories thus defined. For single-agent
systems all the actions of an executable plan must be within its capabilities:
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However, plan-agents in multi agent systems can consider executing plans containing
actions not within their capabilities as long as they can model the capabilities of others.
If such agents are also sociological, then we claim that they can make more informed
choices about plan selection, through a better analysis of situations, as discussed below.
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4 Sociological Agents
Sociological agents with the capacity to model agents, relationships and plans (espe-
cially multi-agent plans) have available to them an appropriate level of detail to coordi-
nate their actions in order to achieve their local goals more effectively. This bold claim
arises from the increased awareness and appreciation not of the agents in their environ-
ment, but of the impact of those agents. In particular, the description of the multi-agent
environment advanced so far enables an analysis to reveal opportunities to exploit ex-
isting relationships and how to minimise effort and avoid conflict.
To illustrate this greater reasoning capacity of sociological agents, we describe be-
low some examples of categories of goals, agents and plans (with respect to the models
of the sociological plan-agent), that may be relevant to an agent’s understanding of its
environment. Each of the categories is formally defined in Figures 4 and 5, in which
the sociological plan-agent is denoted as p|] . Any variable preceded by ·iz#NvU denotes
the models that p] has of some specific type of entity or relationship. For example,
p|]Ò~·iz#NvUYfv.ªy{ﬂTRzwyÓ.vAo.yp and p]VÒ
·iz#NvURzTp are the set of neutral objects and owner-
ship relations the sociological agent models in its environment.
– A self-sufficient plan is any plan that involves only neutral-objects, server-agents
the plan-agent owns, and the plan-agent itself. Self-sufficient plans can therefore
be executed without regard to other agents, and exploit current agent relationships.
(The formal definition makes use of the relational image operator: in general, the
relational image Ô
« Õ
 
Õ
² of a set   through a relation Ô is the set of all objects Ç to
which Ô relates some member © of   .)
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Fig. 4. Sociological Agent Categories I
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Fig. 5. Sociological Agent Categories II
– A self-sufficient goal is any goal in the goal library that has an associated self-
sufficient plan. These goals can then, according to the agent’s model, be achieved
independently of the existing social configuration.
– A reliant-goal is any goal that has a non-empty set of associated plans that is not
self-sufficient.
For each plan that is not self-sufficient, a sociological plan-agent can establish the
autonomous agents that may be affected by its execution, which is an important crite-
rion in selecting a plan from competing active plans. An autonomous agent  may be
affected by a plan in one of two ways: either it is required to perform an action directly,
or it is engaging a server-agent   required by the plan. In this latter case, a sociological
plan-agent can reason about either persuading  to share or release   , taking   without
permission, or finding an alternative server-agent or plan. To facilitate such an analysis,
we consider the following categories of agents and plans, formally defined in Figure 5.
– The cooperating autonomous agents of a plan are those autonomous agents, other
than the plan-agent itself, that are involved in performing actions of that plan. They
will need to cooperate with the plan-agent for the plan to be executed. Formally, an
agent is a cooperating autonomous agent with respect to a plan, if it is contained
in the set entities required for the plan. Note that an agent cannot guarantee that
the identified cooperating agents of a plan will cooperate, only that cooperation is
necessary for the plan to be performed.
– The affected autonomous agents of a plan are those autonomous agents, other than
the plan-agent itself, that are engaging an entity required in the plan. Formally, an
autonomous agent is affected with respect to a plan if a server-agent, contained in
the set of entities required by the plan, is currently engaged by the autonomous
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Fig. 6. Example: A Sociological Agent’s Model
agent. These agents may need to cooperate with the plan-agent. Notice that the
affected autonomous agents do not include the cooperating agents.
– The least-direct-fuss plans for any reliant-goal are those plans that require the
fewest number of cooperating agents.
– The least-fuss plans for any reliant-goal are those plans that require the fewest
number of affected autonomous agents.
The categories described above are useful to an agent both at planning time and at
run time. In the example below we consider their importance in the former case.
5 An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the value to an autonomous sociological plan-agent of being able to anal-
yse plans using the categories above, consider an autonomous sociological plan-agent,
 , and suppose that it models the agent relationships in its environment as follows.
Autonomous agent Û directly owns the server-agent  Ë and directly engages  =Ì ; au-
tonomous agent  directly engages  =Ì ; and  directly owns  'È . In addition, in  ’s
view, ÜÂÈ and Ü[Ë are neutral-objects. This agent configuration can be seen in Figure 6
and would be represented in  ’s models as shown.
Consider also that agent  generates the goal, #Ý , and activates four total plans ® ,
>¯ , V° and Þ to achieve #Ý as follows. The four plans are then in the set of active plans,
and the pair
«
#Ýﬁ¬U­#®+¬V¯T¬>°¬ÞS±T² is in the function o#y¨SvCfRTz#T relating current
goals to candidate active plans. These goals and plans are shown in Figure 7. Notice
that since in plan ® , action #® can be performed by either agents Û or  , and action
U° by either  =Ë or  ZÌ , there are four possible ways of executing it, represented by ]® É ,

®Ê ,  ®ß and  ®à at the end of the figure. The agent then has seven alternative plans for
execution selection.
Now, by inspection, the entities required by the plan >¯ are  ,  ﬁÈ and ÜÂÈ .
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The previous definition of a self-sufficient plan for an agent  is any plan that only
requires neutral-objects, agents owned by  , and  itself. In this case the union of the
set of neutral-objects, owned agents and  itself is simple to calculate.
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Fig. 7. Example agent goals and plans
The set of entities required by >¯ is a subset of this set which means that >¯ is
self-sufficient, as is the associated goal #Ý .
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 is thus able to achieve  Ý without affecting other autonomous agents and can act
without regard to them whilst exploiting the current set of agent relationships. How-
ever, it may decide that, even though  ¯ is self-sufficient, it is too costly, dismisses this
possibility, and evaluates the six other alternatives to give the information shown in Ta-
ble 1. It can be seen that the least-fuss and least-direct-fuss plans are as follows. Each of
the least fuss plans affects only the one agent (in fact agent Û in each case) as a result
of requiring the server-agent S2 which is engaged by Û . Both the direct least fuss plans
require no cooperating agents.
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Based on this analysis,  Þ may seem like the best candidate plan for execution since
it does not involve the direct cooperation of other entities, and only affects one au-
tonomous agent, Û . The plan-agent can then analyse options concerning how to engage
 =Ë . Clearly, the final choice of plan must also consider other factors such as the moti-
vations of the plan-agent, and its models of the motivations of others affected by plans.
Nevertheless, this brief example illustrates just how sociological agents can use the
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Table 1. Example: A Sociological Agent’s Evaluation of its Plans
plan, goal and agent categories defined in this section as important criteria in evaluat-
ing alternative active plans. If agents can model the plans of others, or produce agreed
multi-agent plans, then they can coordinate their actions in order to achieve their local
goals more effectively. Agents can then take advantage of the plans of others to avoid
duplication of effort and to avoid conflict, which arises, for example, when two agents
require direct ownership of the same entity at the same time.
Once agents are designed with the ability to reason about the plans of other agents,
bargaining can take place between agents able to help each other in their plans. As
an example, suppose agent  has a plan that necessarily involves the cooperation of
Û . It may be appropriate for  to consider the plans of Û that involve  ’s coopera-
tion since  may then realise that Û has a high-priority plan that can only be achieved
with  ’s cooperation. In this case  would consider herself to be in a strong bargain-
ing position. The actual level at which other agents are modelled is clearly critical in
directing behaviour. For example, a sociological agent with models of other agents as
non-sociological may realise that these agents are unable to recognise agent relation-
ships. The sociological agent may then be concerned that these other agents may use
entities that destroy their own existing agent relationships.
6 Conclusions
As Castelfranchi has shown in his work on Social Power Theory, the relationships be-
tween agents are critical for effective behaviour in dynamic and open environments
composed of multiple autonomous agents. Without an adequate appreciation of them,
opportunities for interaction to enhance and improve individual agent performance may
be missed, and agents may not be duly exploited. In this paper we have extended previ-
ous work to show how detailed models of plans, and the categories that may be derived
from them, can be used to map the social landscape effectively. This is vital — in our
view, autonomy is an absolute, but it means that agents will seek to exert power over
others. Just as Castelfranchi’s notion of negotiation power provides a measure of the
independence or autonomy of an agent in his view of the world, so it provides us with a
test of whether an agent is autonomous. Power will be used by an agent that can influ-
ence others — an autonomous agent, in seeking to maximise its benefit, must make use
of the information available in its models of agents and relationships.
The analysis we provide is not tailored to any pre-existing model, and is generally
applicable, though it does arise naturally from our clean and simple agent framework.
However, the particular value can be seen in applications that embody critical notions
of dependence among agents such as, for example, Social Power Theory and its com-
putational counterpart, Social Dependence Networks [12]. Our work provides two key
benefits: first, it addresses some of the weaknesses in the SDN model in relation to the
ambiguity of some constructs such as the nature of an owned resource, which we have
clarified and tightened; second, it balances that earlier work which focussed on the
problem situations, such as dependencies, by considering configurations of solutions
to minimise effort and take advantage of opportunities in dealing with dependencies
(through self-sufficient plans, for example). The next step is to explore the space of
plans, goals and agents in more detail, based on the inter-agent relationships described
above, and to show how further, more refined categories in the manner of those above,
impact an agent’s capacity to understand its environment and the agents within it.
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